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1. INTRODUCTION
In the late 19th century, neoclassical economics (the economics of rational
choice and maximisation) developed. Originally, neoclassical economics was
grounded on utilitarian psychology – the assumption that there exists a one-
dimensional, interpersonally comparable measure of mental states (‘pleasure’),
and the hypothesis that rational individual choice was maximisation of this
measure. But some embarrassment about the fact that this measure had never been
found: not clear why we should expect to find such a measure.
In the 20th century, economists abandoned the utilitarian assumptions but
retained most of the theoretical structure that had originally been derived from
those assumptions: the foundations of the theory were changed, but the super-
structure was kept. The new foundations were postulates about preferences, or
about choices; rationality was construed as consistency of preference or of choice
– and not, as before, instrumental rationality (in pursuit of pleasure).
Pareto is generally regarded as the prime instigator of this switch, and main-
stream rational choice theory – Hicks, Allen, Samuelson… – has followed,
although re-interpreted, Pareto’s epistemological foundations of microeconomics.
Pareto is therefore at the crossroad of contemporaries theories of choice: both the
standard approach and the critical ones can be fruitfully analysed compared with
the ideas of Pareto on this issue. In particular, in this paper the comparison is done
by means of the role of psychology in Pareto’s theory: Pareto having finding that
the psychological theory beyond economics lacked support, instead of looking for
better psychological foundations (i.e. conserve the question, look for the correct
answer) changed the interpretation of the foundations (i.e. conserve the answer,
look for a different question which will make it correct).
Between the end of 1899 and early 1900, Pareto, breaking away from the first
generation of marginalists-hedonists, pursued two fundamental and distinct
objectives, to be considered his main legacy to contemporary economic science:
a) ordinalism, or the replacement of a cardinal by an ordinal utility function, by
transforming the Cardinalist Edgeworth’s indifference curves into ordinal
ones;
b) the interpretation of ophelimity as an index of preferences, or the emancipation
of his theory of choice and equilibrium from hedonism. In the turning point of
1899 Pareto built up his economic theory on « the naked fact of choice »,
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without having to resort to important measuring and not even to the existence
of utility (Pareto, 1984, pp. 290-291)1.
With these goals he achieved only a part of his project, the part he considered
the easiest. In the 30’s Hicks, Allen, Samuelson and others rediscovered Pareto’s
theory of choice. In a atmosphere of behaviourism, operationalism and neo-
positivism, Pareto was presented as the founder of a new economic science, based
on facts, free from unobservable metaphysical categories such as pleasure and
utility.
Although this is a very well-known story, it is not the whole story.
In fact, in this reading of Pareto the image that emerges is that of an uncertain,
confused and almost schizophrenic author. He was regarded as a talented precur-
sor, who, however, created a hybrid, something halfway between the old and the
new. Hicks sums this up succinctly:
even after Pareto had established his great proposition, he continued to use concepts
derived from the earlier set of ideas. The reason was, perhaps, that he did not take the
trouble to rework his earlier conclusions in the light of a proposition, which he only
reached at a rather late stage of his work in economics. However that may be, he missed
an opportunity (Hicks 1939 [1946], p. 19).
Hicks and Allen immediately began speaking of an incomplete Paretian revo-
lution, basing their argument on the many passages in which Pareto used concepts
which were still based on cardinalist and utilitarian categories.
During the following decades, many historians and economists went back to
the viewpoint of Hicks, and still continue to make the same assessments.
After having demonstrated that Pareto systematically made use of a cardinal
idea of utility (ophelimity), Oskar Lange asked himself : ‘Was it inconsistent of
Pareto to keep these definitions in spite of regarding utility as immeasurable?’
(Lange 1934, p. 218), and after a lengthy and detailed analysis, he concludes that
the answer was yes. The same evaluation can be found in Stigler and in Samuel-
son: ‘Pareto was inconsistent’ (Stigler 1950, p. 389; Samuelson 1974, p. 1256)2.
To those authors who interpret his work, the very fact that Pareto continued
referring to a cardinal idea of ophelimity also confirms the argument that Pareto
continued to adopt a hedonistic philosophy despite claiming to have overcome the
‘hedonistic season’ in economics. Therefore, from the 1930s, Pareto’s main
achievements as regards the theory of utility, were accused of being inconsistent.
In previous works I have tried to demonstrate that within the context of his
philosophy of science, Pareto’s theory of choice is not inconsistent but, rather,
much more complex, profound and more sophisticated than the interpretations of
his work that have been attempted.
In this paper I intend to show that Pareto’s theory of choice is much more
complex than his Anglo-Saxon rediscovers thought. Pareto’s theory of choice
presents open questions, but they are different than the mainstream interpretation
thinks.
1 Letter to Pantaleoni of January 1899 (in Pareto, 1984, II, pp. 290-291).
2 Recent papers which confirm this assessment are those by Lewin (1996, p. 1309), and
Drakopoulos (1991, p. 110).
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2. PARETO’S REVOLUTION AND THE BIRTH
OF MODERN RATIONAL CHOICE
2.1. Pareto’s theory of action
Towards the end of the 19th century, Pareto began teaching sociology at the
University of Lausanne, and, just like what happened a few years earlier with
economics, «having to teach it – he wrote to Antonucci – made me study it better,
and I realised that many of my theories had to be modified to become scientific »
[Pareto (1975), p. 614].
Already during the first months of this new study, Pareto individualises the
focal idea of his sociology, the theory of logical and non-logical actions; this was a
theory that revealed itself as being the key to a new and scientific reading of all of
history. The social dynamics is governed by two great forces: the logical ones,
easily studied, yet rare and limited to a very restricted circle (individual and logical
actions); and by the non-logical ones, the vast majority, studied with great diffi-
culty because we cannot, by definition, apply that type of logic, which is mathe-
matics to them and because they have never been studied [Pareto (1900b), p. 162]3.
In order to understand Pareto’s revolution in economics in all its implications
with respect to human interactions, we must look at his philosophy of science. In
line with Mill’s methodology4, economics, to Pareto, only studies a small part of
the human behaviour. There is also another aspect, «born of non-logical actions,
which also need to be studied. Here difficulties begin to arise» (Pareto, 1900b,
p. 162). In this assertion, we can find a synthesis of Pareto’s methodology of action.
A real action presents two main components :
a) the logical component, based on a pure instrumental reasoning, where the
means are adequate to the end, subjectively and objectively;
b) the non-logical one, where non-logical does not mean illogical or irrational
but just based on a different type of logic, as Pareto many times has specified5.
Economics deals with the logical part, and its work is simple. Sociology deals
with the rest, and its work is very difficult. To study the non-logical part of an
action, to understand the phenomenon: this was the main challenge Pareto
confronted for the rest of his life. Only within his epistemology is it possible to
fully comprehend Pareto’s analysis of action.
The foundation of his methodology is in fact the use of the method of analysis
and synthesis: to decompose the complex action into its parts, investigate each
separately, and attempt a synthesis – for Pareto synthesis means « sociological
synthesis ».
3 This is also the meaning of chapter III of the Treatise on General Sociology (1916) and the
severe criticism turned against many of the important authors of the past, among which Spencer,
Comte and Mill : as soon as the researchers caught a glimpse of non-logical actions they would imme-
diately turn back to the logical ones.
4 On the strict methodological similarity between Pareto and Mill see Bruni and Guala (2001).
5 The best and more complete definition of Pareto’s theory of logical and non-logical actions can
be found in Pareto (1916), §§ 150-152.
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In establishing the boundaries between the economic and the social spheres of
human action, Pareto used the logic of action as criterion.
Pareto, furthermore, specified that pure economics deals not only with logical
action but also with self-centred « choices that the individual makes considering
solely the things that he prefers », omitting, or better yet, turning over to sociology,
actions « that the individual makes considering the effects that these choices will
have on other individuals» (Pareto, 1900a, p. 223).
In the theory of logical and non-logical actions, he believed that he had found
the path across which he would give his own personal and main contribution to the
history of social science.
Here too, the idea itself is not new, yet Pareto wanted to be the first one to
apply it to social science.
Therefore, according to Pareto, in order to understand human action and thus
the social system, one must analyse and then synthesise study the logical and non-
logical aspects separately, and then put them back together again in the synthesis6.
Without this synthesis, human action cannot be understood, neither in the
economic field (where the logical aspect prevails), nor in the non-economic field.
To Pareto economics deals with a very narrow slice of human and social life :
if you would understand the social action you must study separately the logical
and the non-logical part of it : the two parts are based on two completely different
kind of rationality, which cannot be reduced to one unique genre. The impossibil-
ity of a universal logic of choice was the message lanced by Pareto to the social
sciences: a message that, despite the standard historiography, was completely
missed by his « followers ».
2.2. The modern Rational Choice Theory: an escape from Pareto?
The birth of the modern Rational Choice Theory normally begins with the
« theory of choice» of Pareto, whose results were re-proposed and publicised in
1934 by John Hicks and R.G.D. Allen, the protagonists of the real ‘ordinalist
revolution’ which replaced traditional utilitarianism with the modern consumer
theory. From the late thirties onwards Paul Samuelson in a series of works took the
ordinalist revolution to the extreme with his ‘revealed preferences’ approach. The
mathematical economists of the fifties finished the job.
However, in this paper I would like to emphasise just one point : that there is a
radical difference between Pareto’s theory of action and those of Hicks and
contemporary microeconomics, a difference that is very much related to contem-
porary analysis of personal interactions7.
6 The method of Analysis and synthesis may be found in the first chapter of his Manuel of
Economic Politics : « abstraction is, for all the sciences, the preliminary and indispensable requirement
for all research. (…) When we return to the concrete from the abstract, the parts which had been sepa-
rated in order to study them better must be united again» (Pareto, 1971 [1906], I, §§ 20; 26). In fact,
the analysis of other kinds of social interactions, based on a non-instrumental rationality, is present in
his Sociology. For example the « residues of the fourth class » (Residues in relation with sociality:
Pareto, 1916, §§ 113-1206), are entirely dedicated to « the want for sociality».
7 For a broader analysis of the continuity or discontinuity between Pareto and the microeconom-
ics of the thirties see Bruni and Guala (2001).
96 LUIGINO BRUNI
In a 1934 paper with Roy Allen, Hicks, under the influence of the neoposi-
tivistic philosophy, wrote: «The methodological implications of [the new]
conception of utility [...] are far-reaching indeed. By transforming the subjective
theory of value into a general logic of choice, they extend its applicability over
wide fields of human conduct (Hicks e Allen, 1934, p. 45, my italic).
The same concept is restated in Value and Capital:
that there are a great many such extensions appears at once when we consider how wide
is the variety of human choices which can be fitted into the framework of the Paretian
scale of preference (Hicks, 1939, p. 24).
It is a methodological attitude very close to that of Wicksteed. In fact, in
reviewing Pareto’s Manuel (1906), Wicksteed criticised the book for having
restricted the domain of economics, which, for Pareto, makes up « a very small
part of the actual phenomena of the business» (Wicksteed, 1906, p. 817). But
above all, according to Wicksteed, Pareto does not realise that his « curves of
indifference» can cover a much greater area of human behaviour.
Obviously, as seen, Pareto had a completely different idea of action. He
realised that economic laws explained a small part of human behaviour. The kinds
of logic behind economic and non-economic actions are substantially different. To
utilise the structure of the theory of choice presupposes in Pareto’s approach that
agents are performing logical actions. This is very clear in all his scientific work
(«What everybody surely knows, since here we are dealing with logical action, is
that…» Pareto, 1898, p. 128, my italic).
In fact the theory of choice was introduced by Pareto in 1900, after having
developed his theory of logical and non-logical actions. His theory of economic
action before 1900 was still based on pleasure.
In the Manual, Pareto clearly specifies that his whole economic theory is valid
for «many logical, repeated actions which men perform to procure the things
which satisfy their tastes» (1971 [1906], III, § 1). Therefore, it is not strange either
that we don’t find indifference curves in his Sociology, or that he has devoted the
second half of his life to study Sociology, to write his cyclopic Treatise, in order to
understand the dynamics and laws of the different « kind of logic» which governs
the great part of actions. Only after having written a scientific sociology, a scien-
tific analysis of the non-logical part of the action, Pareto would have completed
his project, that is to write a «Treatise on synthetic economics », which would be
able to combine the logical and non-logical elements present in every economic
action. He never completed such a book, and nobody has followed Pareto in this
project8.
3. THE «PARADOXES» OF PARETIAN THEORY OF ACTION
The methodological fundamentalism, i.e. the a-priori conviction that only the
natural method of analysis and synthesis, combined with the « naked fact of
choice», is the scientific method for every inquiry, brought Pareto to some
8 See Bruni (1997b).
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paradoxes in aspects very central in his economic theory, that is the foundation of
his indifference curves, which means the whole theory of choice and the general
equilibrium analysis built on it.
Let us see why.
First of all, Pareto, in the ch. III of the Manual states that « we will study the
many logical, repeated actions which men perform to procure the things which
satisfy their tastes » (§ 1).
A such a theory of logical actions poses two main problems: the so-called inte-
grability problem, and the role of psychology in economics.
3.1. The Integrability Problem
Logical action in Pareto’s system includes the ordinary economic activities of
consumers, not just the businessman we heard about before. Notice also that
Pareto here is taking it as given that ‘tastes’ and ‘desires’ exist in a form which
gives rise to a maximisation problem with a correct answer, which can be learned
by trial and error.
This issue is an expression of Pareto’s version of the integrability problem.
In plain words (without too much technicalities), Pareto’s version of integra-
bility problem (that is quite different from the standard one: see Chipman et al
1971) is quite easy. The slope of indifference curves can be, theoretically o
« imaginary» (Pareto only imagines that the agent, interrogated, will give the
answers that economists need to know: but, in reality, there are no economist, no
agents, no real experiments: only imaginary ones9), deduced from all possible
bundles of goods from budgetary data, being 
Then Pareto thought to be possible to obtain empirically the differential equa-
tion of the indifference lines: can we integrate it in order to obtain the equation of
indifference lines? Mathematically the issue is : does the integral line
f(x1,x2,x3,...)dx1+g(x1,x2,x3,...)dx2= 0, exist independently of the path between the
beginning and end points? If the preferences system displays a proper continuity,
the equation is integrable.
But if we, like Pareto, want that the entire theory « rest only on experience »,
on choices, nobody ensures us of the existence of continue and differentiable lines
of indifference. Economically it is to demonstrate that the choices « that an indi-
vidual makes between combinations of goods differing by infinitesimal amounts
[will] be consistent with the choices he makes between combinations differing by
finite amounts. For example, the individual starts with the combination 100X1,
100X2, 100X3. By infinitesimal steps we obtain an infinite number of combina-
tions, each equivalent to the preceding, reaching ultimately the combination
90X1, 85X2, 120X3. Will the individual consider this last combination equivalent
to the first?» (Stigler 1950 [1965], pp. 122-123).
Pareto first mentioned the so-called « integrability problem» in a letter to
Pantaleoni (December 1891), where he refers to Antonelli (1886), who can be











rightly considered as the first economist who has stated the integrability problem
in economic terms10.
Pareto had dealt with the integrability problem in the Considerazioni (1892-
93), where he still used the cardinal indifference curves (à la Edgeworth), and in
a footnote, he specified that only ‘when there are only two goods, the equation [of
the lines of indifference] can always be integrated’ (Pareto 1892-93 [1982],
p. 299, footnote). In the Cours (1896) we find again this specification, that,
however, he forgot in the Manual, and the Italian mathematician Vito Volterra
(1906, p. 300), gently reminded it to him.
In fact, in an overall positive review to the Manual, Volterra ‘performed one of
the few services professional mathematicians have ever rendered to economy
theory’ (Samuelson 1950, p. 355), pointed out that : a) in the case of only two
goods, there will be an infinite number of equations whose indifference curves
represent the same preferences (that is there is an infinite number of integrating
factors to the differential equations) ; b) if the goods are independent, that is the
ophelimity of the good A (Fa) is only a function of a and Fb is only the function
of b (hypothesis of separateness), then in cases a) and b) we reach a unique func-
tion that certainly exists ; c) in the case of more than two goods, the problem is
more complicated because a trinomial (or a greater number of terms) differential
equation could not admit a differential factor.
Volterra’s annotation was greatly appreciated by Pareto, and it provoked first
the article L’ofelimità dei cicli non chiusi (Pareto 1906 [1982]), a paper written by
starting from an analogous problem in thermodynamics with open and close
cycles (only the closed cycles conserve the potential energy), and then provoked
some of the variations embodied in the Mathematical Appendix of the French
edition of the Manual in the 1909. Pareto’s integrability problem is mainly known
in the history of economics for a mistake he made in identifying the order of inte-
gration with the order of consumption, that caused even sarcastic jokes (‘I don’t
know whether he drinks his beer before his whisky or his whisky before his beer’:
Samuelson 1950, p. 361). Truly, in the dialogue with Volterra, Pareto despite
Volterra’s emphasis on mathematical conditions for the integrability of indiffer-
ence lines, and Pareto confusion between the order of integration and the order of
consumption, the real issue behind was just about the question of defining a utility
function over consumption paths (that are derived directly from ‘experience’),
and, more deeply, a problem of transitivity in choices: «The correct translation of
the integrability problem was in terms of the consistency of consumer prefer-
ences» (Stigler 1950, p. 124)11.
John Hicks accused Pareto of having spent to much energy on the ‘mysterious
theory of open and closed cycles’, a problem that, according to Hicks, ‘fascinates
mathematicians, but it does not seem to have any economic importance at all’
(1939 [1946], p. 19, footnote 1). The English economist attributed this error to the
10 Pareto sarcastically asserts that ‘Antonelli went right into the clouds’ (1984 [1960], I, p. 121),
but, actually, Antonelli was not only the first who dealt with the integrability problem, but also the first
who used the theory of ‘open and closed cycles’ of thermodynamics in the analysis of economic prob-
lems, just as Pareto would do a few years later.
11 See also Demaria (1962), pp. 505-514.
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fact that Pareto never went back to ‘rework his earlier conclusions’ (Ivi, p. 19):
perhaps Hicks missed the methodological meaning behind this factor of integra-
tion.
In fact the integrability problem became extremely important for Pareto, and
he dedicated a good part of his energies to it in his last works on pure economics
(Pareto 1911 [1982], pp. 597, 614). The demonstration of the conditions for the
integration of the indifference curves was a necessity for his ‘experimental’
program: to start, at least theoretically, directly from the indifference curves in
pure economics, and from that build the system of general economic equilibrium.
Samuelson too, like Hicks, misunderstood that the serious economic problem
discussed by Pareto from 1906 on was not the ‘technical’ integrability problem,
rather the measurability of utility, starting from empirical data (indifference
curves), a core issue of his experimental research project. This is very clear as soon
as one reads Pareto’s article on open and closed cycles, which, despite the intention
of Volterra of turning Pareto’s attention towards the technicalities of the integrabil-
ity problem, is almost entirely devoted to the measurability of (ordinal) utility.
Therefore, although Hicks’ and Samuelson’s criticism to Pareto’s confusion is
right as far as the integrability problem strictu sensu is concerned, both of them,
however, did not understand that Pareto’s aim in that ‘problem’ was another one,
that is the old purpose of expelling the metaphysical utility from economic
theory12.
Pareto was aware that there is a deep problem in his project of expunging the
metaphysical from economics, namely how justify the assumption that indiffer-
ence curves exist, when all we have to go on are the facts of experience. If this
problem can’t be solved, he can be accused of helping himself to an assumption
about economic behaviour (transitivity) which depends for its rationale on ‘meta-
physical’ arguments about the internal properties of utility.
Therefore, Pareto’s integrability problem is very much related to the role of
psychology in the theory of rational choice13.
12 Even Samuelson in 1938, in his first article on ‘revealed preferences’, defines the problem of
integrability as a ‘puzzling’ theme he had ‘little to say’ about (Samuelson 1938, p. 68). This is not the
right time to investigate how Samuelson dealt later, in 1950, with the problem of integrability. Only a
mention of the fact that he too (like Stigler 1950) demonstrated that Pareto confused the integrability
problem with the problem of the order of consumption, which in fact is a pseudo economic problem.
13 The greatest debate on the integrability problem occurred after the publication of Mirowski’s
More Heat than Light (1989). Mirowski gave another interpretation of Pareto’s integrability problem
(with which I cannot agree), seeing it as a proof that Pareto was the ‘most ruthless proponent of the
physical metaphor’ (p. 221). To Mirowski the ‘problem of integrability, far from being merely an arcane
game played by a small coterie of mathematicians, was (and still is) the key to the understanding and
evaluation of the neoclassical cooptation of the physics metaphor’ (p. 250). According to Mirowski it
‘is not to Pareto credit that he took the metaphor of a path too literally, associating it with the effect of
the temporal order of consumption of particular commodities. His example of the order of consumption
of soup and roast beef made the problem sound trivial, an opinion he himself expressed in the first page
of the paper. The triviality of the problem derived from Pareto’s interpretation, however, and not from
the intrinsic character of the problem’ (p. 249). Mirowski’s thesis on the integrability – which is linked
to the main thesis of the book, i.e. neoclassical theory as a ‘wholesale’ metaphorical appropriation of the
analytical structure of mid-nineteenth century physics, a theme that goes beyond the evaluation of
Pareto, and beyond the scope of this book too – has been discussed by several economists, such as
Hands (1993) and Carlson (1997). Cf. also Malinvaud (1993) and Kirman (1999).
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3.2 The debate on Psychology and Economics
in the fist marginalist economists
When Pareto looked upon economic science, the mainstream methodology,
the English one above all, conceived economic science as a deductive science,
built on a priori laws drawn mainly from introspection14.
Psychological introspection was seen as the possibility of pinpointing the laws
that regulate economic activity (such as the desire for wealth). On these laws the
economist began constructing an abstract, positive and deductive economic
science autonomous to the other branches of knowledge, even if connected to
them.
An interesting question is whether economics felt the influences of the
methodological changes that occurred in psychology with the birth of modern
experimental psychology, after 1860s.
The German Gustav T. Fechner and before him E.H. Weber upheld the funda-
mental thesis (and revolutionary at that time) of the possibility of measuring
mental phenomena, since the laws that govern the relationship between mid and
body could be individualised in a quantitative relationship between mental sensa-
tions and material stimuli.
Fechner clearly asserted the possibility of empirically measuring sensations,
which developed the important research program known as psychophysics (the
word is self-explanatory: the science of the relationships between the mental and
the material world). The result that came from his research went into a textbook in
1860 (Elements of psychophysics), a book often considered as the birth of
psychology, rightly on the eve of the «marginalist revolution ». The program
begun by Fechner was then continued by Wilhelm Wundt (1852-1920), another
German scientist considered the true father of experimental psychology as an
autonomous discipline, with the publication of his Principles of Physiological
Psychology (1873-74), the very same years of the marginalist turning point (the
power of dates ! And of the cultural climate !). Wundt made his experiments in a
laboratory under tight experimental conditions, and classified the sensations on
the basis of their intensity, duration and the modality of the sense (the links with
the theory of utility of Jevons and Edgeworth can be noted immediately), where
we can also see a similarity with the characteristics of pain and pleasure of Becca-
ria and Bentham: duration, intensity, certitude and proximity. He then formulated
a three-dimensional theory of sentiments (pleasure-displeasure, tension-relax-
ation, excitement-depression), but in this he was less followed by other econo-
mists who based their own theories on the mono-dimensional utility (pleasure-
pain).
Although many marginalists considered Fechner’s law similar to the
«Bernoulli’s hypothesis» on the diminishing marginal utility of money, these two
theories must be kept distinct. In 1713 Daniel Bernoulli, in his studies on proba-
bility, gambling and insurance, shown that equal increment of gain yields an
advantage which is inversely proportional to individual’s wealth:
14 This is the position held by Mill (Mill 1843 [1862], II, p. 508), and later by Jevons, Cairnes, or
Pantaleoni, a position masterly synthesised by J.N. Keynes (1891)[1963] in a work that can be consid-
ered the icon of the methodology of the first generation of marginalists.
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where dU is the increment of utility resulting from an increment dx of wealth (x)
(k is a constant). From that follows that total utility is a logarithmic function of
wealth:
(c is the subsistence consumption)15. Bernoulli’s line of research «was joined by
the independent series of researches that culminated in the Weber-Fechner law»
(Stigler 1950 [1965], p. 113). Weber-Fechner law, or simply Fechner law tells that
the just « noticeable increment to any stimulus is proportional to the stimulus »
(Ibid.), and it can be written as it follows:
(where S = sensation, R = stimulus, R0 = the threshold of sensation). This law then
shown the decreasing intensity of stimuli, and the consequent thesis that the
effects of the intensity of stimuli are not absolute but dependent on the quantity of
already existing sensations. The similitude with Bernoulli’s law is great. Weber
and Fechner were the founders of the « experimental psychology», that is to prove
that psychological laws are based on experimental data. All this generation of
psychologists based their methodology on introspection, that is the examination
of one’s state of mind, psychology being the science of conscious experience.
E.B. Titchener developed and then revolutionised the approach by Wundt
founding, in America, the Structuralism. He felt substantially the same way about
the theme of introspection, as can be seen by his Textbook of Psychology of 1909:
« the method of psychology is, then, observation. To distinguish it from the obser-
vation of physical science, which is inspection, a looking-at, psychological obser-
vation has been termed introspection, a looking-within» (quoted in Schultz e
Schultz 1996, p. 111).
Generally speaking, this was the state of the art in psychology during margin-
alist revolution.
Which, then, the relationship between the first experimental psychology and
marginalist economics in the last quarter of XIX century ? If we look at marginal-
ist book of this time it is common to find the reference to the Fechner’s law, some-
times distinguished (Pantaleoni 1883) but normally associated to Bernoulli’s
hypothesis. But apart from Edgeworth (1881) and, in minor measure, Wicksell (in
his financial economics), in the other marginalist economists (including Jevons
and Pantaleoni) the reference to this psychological literature is only one further













proof that their theory on decreasing of marginal utility was scientific, and they
«made no real use of the theory » (Stigler 1950, p. 115).
Edgeworth deserves a special mention in this history. In his Mathematical
Psychics (1881) the reference to Fecher, Wundt and the experimental psychology
is important in order to scientifically justify the measurement of pleasure in his
utility theory. In formulating his axiom that «Pleasure is measurable and all plea-
sure are commensurable» (1881, p. 59), he mentions that «Wundt has shown that
sensuous pleasures may thereby be measured, and, as utilitarians hold, all pleasure
are commensurable … and the rate of increase of pleasure decreases as its means
increase» (pp. 60, 61). Edgeworth was the marginalist economist who most took
seriously the findings of experimental psychology of his time. Already in 1877 in
his «New and Old methods of Ethics» he tried to found his economics on psychol-
ogy, in particular on psychophysics developed in Germany few years before
(Weber, Fechner and Wundt in particular). To him the results of psychophysics
were the way to build economics both on hedonism and experimental facts
(Fechner’s law was a way – which had little success in economics – of measuring
stimuli and sensations: Edgeworth applied this law for measuring pleasure and
utility). When contemporary economists (such as Frank 1997) use the findings of
the neurosciences in order to measure the level of happiness, they – aware or not
they can be – methodologically are in continuity with Edgeworth’s hedonometry.
3.3. More at the point : Pareto and Psychology
Pareto wrote the Cours with the problems of the « scientificity » of psychology
in mind, and reached his own vision of the relationship between psychology and
economics. He considered psychology as an experimental science: « the aim of
this book is to construct economics on the model of the experimental sciences
such as physics, chemistry, psychology » (Cours, premise).
After few years, Pareto finished his revolution on the theory of choice, which
moved in the opposite direction of the contemporary psychological and economic
movement. Why ?
What in the 20th century has been called « the demarcation problem » (how to
distinguish science from what is not?), one of the core issues of the philosophers
of Vienna Circle, was of fundamental importance for Pareto. To distinguish his
economics and sociology from literature («novels »), science from metaphysics,
was a fundamental necessity for him.
Pareto, too simply, found the solution in the distinction between the objective
(i.e. science) and the subjective (i.e. non-science). Because of this, in the
economic science he made a radical choice, basing it on « objective» facts, reject-
ing all of the subjective and psychological dimensions in the preferences.
In Pareto the « experimental» or empirical dimension can be found, above all,
in the objective verification: the external experimental data is the primary element
of science for him. This is the meaning of many of Pareto’s assertions, among
which one mentioned in a letter to Naville : « Pure political economy therefore has
a great interest in taking the least possible from the domain of psychology » (in
Busino 1964, p. xxiv) ; or when he affirmed that one of the main conquests of the
theory of choice was that « every psychological analysis is eliminated » (Pareto
1900a, preamble).
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For this reason it is not wrong to say that Pareto did in economics what in
psychology did few years later the «behaviourist movement». In fact J. B.
Watson, in 1913, with the publication of Psychology as the Behaviourist Views It
gave birth to Behaviourism, a movement that completely broke away from the
past, re-founding the psychological science on « external » bases: ‘Psychology as
the behaviourist point of views it is a purely objective experimental branch of
natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behaviour.
Introspection forms no essential part of its method’ (Watson 1913, p. 158).
Lewin (1996, pp. 1308 seq.), in noting the great assonance between Pareto’s
theory of choice and the behaviourist movement, says that as the first experimen-
tal psychology had influenced the first generation of marginalist hedonist, the
same behaviourism influenced the experimental turning point in economics
between XIX and XX, Pareto in particular.
In reality the story is more complex. Although it is right to say that just «as
Watson hoped that behaviourism would bring psychology into the natural science,
Pareto hoped that ordinalism would forge economics into a science on a par with
physics » (Lewin 1996, p. 1308), it is incorrect to think that behaviourism (as
psychological movement) had any influence in Pareto’s theory of choice or in the
«Paretian economics » in the 1930s (Hicks, Samulson, Schultz ...)16. In fact Pareto
wrote his new theory of choice at the end of XIX (1899), when behaviourism was
still far away, and the psychology was still dominated by introspection.
What is instead surely true is that psychology and economics have been both
influenced by physics, but, after a brief season of trust on Fechner’ law, they
followed two parallel lines, at least as far as the leading economists are concerned.
As far as psychology is concerned behaviorism had very little to do with the
new consumer and demand theory of the 1930s. There were in fact (American)
economists directly influenced during the 1920s by behaviorism, but this line of
thought lasted only a short while. Economists such as Zenas C. Dickinson, A. J.
Snow, Frank and others tried to construct a sort of «behaviourist economics», by
extending that methodology from psychology to economics. In particular they
intented to substitute a old, naive and «methaphysical» psychology with a exper-
imental one. Then they criticised the first generation of economists psychologists
(i.e. Edgeworth) because « their use of metaphysical notion in their explanation of
inborn behaviour ... we object to the invocation of forces or implulses as the
primary causes of native activity» (Snow 1924, p. 488).
This « behaviourist » attempt has left no mark in economics.
To Pareto, instead, even if psychology is substantially an experimental science
and he does not exclude that one day, when knowledge will have progressed and
one can start with the psychological fact, he could use psychology as a basis for
his theory, nevertheless he was considering psychology more fragile (from an
epistemic point if view) than the « fact of choice ». Regarding Fechner, Wundt and
«experimental» psychology, in the Manual he wrote: « In the great variety of
16 Economists such as Hicks or Schultz had an attitude towards psychology very similar to
Pareto’s at his time (psychology is, or can be, scientific but economics has no interest to rest on
psychology, because can reach its objectives without it). It is the same positivistic attitude and method-
ology (Ockham’s razor).
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economic uses, there are many that are too far removed from the phenomena to
which Fechner’s law applies. It is better to resort directly to experience, and the
latter shows us that for a great many uses or consumptions the elementary ophe-
limity does indeed diminish in the quantities consumed » (1971 [1909], IV, § 33).
For Pareto, basing economic and social sciences on psychology or on the fact
of choice is mainly a question of the epistemological degree of confidence: the
analysis of the curves of indifference is a much more secure basis, yet psycholog-
ical analysis is not « non-scientific»: it is only less secure and always requires the
verification of objective experience.
CONCLUSIONS
Economic theory of 1930s, thanks also to neopositivist philosophy, has
followed Pareto’s experimental economics: Hicks, Allen, Samuelson and many
other explicitly linked their methodological approach to rational choice to
Pareto’s Manual, in particular to his anti-methaphisics and his ordinalism. At the
same time, the standard interpretations of Pareto’s economic revolution as
‘incomplete’ and ‘inconsistent’.
I have tried to show that Pareto’s viewpoint presents its own complexity, which
makes it substantially different from those of his Anglo-Saxon followers of the
1930s.
The are three plausible readings of Pareto’s inconsistencies:
1. A coherence has to be found at the methodological level : it is the thesis of my
book;
2. Pareto is a « perfect substitute» of Hicks: all problems were just «wording »:
he had in mind not « marginal utility» but the marginal rate of substitution,
that does not need at all nor total neither marginal utility (a dialogue with
Giovanni Vailati, dated 1901, goes against this interpretation);
3. The inconsistency is real : Pantaleoni and Edgeworth were right.
There is, however, an implausible reading of Pareto’s theory of choice: to
apply the « methodology of indifference curves» beyond his narrow field; in other
words, transform Pareto’s theory of economic choice into a general theory of
human action.
In spite of Pareto, Rational choice theory, the core of mainstream economics,
is becoming a general language one can use to explain any type of human interac-
tion: from economics to politics, from culture to religion. The present methodol-
ogy of economics (and physics) is characterised by ‘imperialistic tendencies: they
repeatedly aspire to account for almost every-thing’ (Cartwright 1999, p. 1).
The economic approach to human behaviour by Becker and his school analy-
ses all kinds of decisions by using the methodology of rational choice – maximis-
ing objective functions under constraint (Becker 1996). This approach is based on
the methodological assumption of the possibility and goodness of analysing
human behaviour by extending the field of action of economic theorising.
Not only has current economic science not followed Pareto in the direction
indicated by his synthetic economics, but it has solved the problem of the
PARETO’S LEGACY IN MODERN ECONOMICS 105
complexity of action by making the field of application of economics coincide
with that of intentional choice in all fields: ‘contemporary economics provides
models not just for the prices of the rights for off-shore oil drilling, where the
market meets very nice conditions, but also for the effects of liberal abortion poli-
cies on teenage pregnancies, for whom we marry and when we divorce and for the
rationale of political lobbies’ (Cartwright 1999, p. 1). Indeed, rational choice
theory uses its tools even to explain social phenomena where different kinds of
reasoning are at work; as a consequence economic rationality is increasingly
enlarging its domain of application even covering every human action that deals
with intentional choices: exactly the opposite of what Pareto considered to be the
task of economics.
At the basis of such a methodology lies the anthropological assumption that
man ‘most of the time’ is moved by rational calculations to pursue his own indi-
vidual interests. Instead, for Pareto ‘most of the time’ passions, feelings, ideals
that cannot be analysed by the ‘logic’ of economic science are what drive human
beings.
The dissatisfaction of many contemporary economists – and they are
constantly increasing in number – with the theory of rational choice because it
fails to account for phenomena caused by ‘non-logical’ reasons, signifies that
‘Pareto’s dream’ still has some very important things to tell us ! Pareto’s theory of
action is, therefore, important not because of the answers he provides – which
belong to the history of mechanical and positivistic systems of thought – but
because of the questions he raises. Questions that are still very up to date.
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